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4.1. Introduction 
Various economics paradigms treat innovation in fundamentally different ways. This 
paper focuses on neo-classical economics, in comparison with classical economics 
along their major assumptions, notions, research questions, and methods from the point 
of innovation in general, and social innovation, in particular. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 recalls briefly that innovation had been a 
major theme in classical economics. Then Section 4.3 shows that neo-classical 
economics essentially abandoned all research questions concerned with dynamics, and 
instead focused on optimisation. In this framework only certain types of innovations can 
be analysed. 
Given abundant empirical findings and theoretical work on firm behaviour and the 
operation of markets, mainstream industrial economics and organisational theory has 
relaxed the most unrealistic assumptions of neo-classical economics, especially perfect 
information, deterministic environments, perfect competition, and constant or 
diminishing returns. Yet, several major shortcomings have remained: (i) institutional 
issues are not addressed satisfactorily in these branches of economics, either; (ii) a very 
narrow concept of uncertainty is used; (iii) no adequate theory is offered on the creation 
of knowledge used in innovation activities and technological interdependence amongst 
firms; and (iv) the role of government is not analysed in a way that would provide a 
sound and constructive guidance to policy-makers. (Fagerberg et al. eds., 2005; Foray 
ed., 2009; Lazonick, 2013; Lundvall and Borrás, 1999; Smith, 2000) Evolutionary 
economics of innovation – drawing also on institutional economics – rests on radically 
different postulates compared to mainstream economics. These latter schools, however, 
are not discussed in this contribution. 
The main question of this paper, that is, how social innovation challenges neo-classical 
economic assumptions regarding technological innovation is addressed in the 
concluding section. 
Innovation is a modern term – first applied extensively in economics by Schumpeter –, 
and thus authors belonging to classical and neo-classical economics have not used it. 
For the sake of simplicity, however, this notion is ‘retrospectively’ introduced in certain 
parts of this paper. 
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4.2. Technical, organisational and institutional changes: a subject in 
classical economics 
Although classical economics cannot be regarded as a paradigm – in terms of having 
shared axioms, basic notions, research questions, methods, postulates or main theses – it 
can be safely generalised that major classical economists had put a strong emphasis on 
technical, organisational and institutional changes when analysing “the Nature and 
Causes of the Wealth of Nations”, the “Principles of Political Economy”, or “the 
Principles of Political Economy and Taxation”. More generally, these authors had paid 
attention to historical developments (long-term issues) and thus to the dynamic nature of 
the economy and considered it embedded in political and social structures. 
A fundamental notion in Adam Smith’s theory is the division of labour, that is, an 
organisational innovation, using modern terminology. In developing his arguments, 
further aspects of innovations are also explained – such as learning, introduction of 
machinery, better organisation of production processes – and various sources of 
innovations are mentioned. 
“This great increase of the quantity of work which, in consequence of the division of labour, 
the same number of people are capable of performing, is owing to three different 
circumstances; first to the increase of dexterity in every particular workman; secondly, to the 
saving of the time which is commonly lost in passing from one species of work to another; 
and lastly, to the invention of a great number of machines which facilitate and abridge 
labour, and enable one man to do the work of many. (…) 
(…) the invention of all those machines by which labour is so much facilitated and abridged, 
seems to have been originally owing to the division of labour. Men are much more likely to 
discover easier and readier methods of attaining any object, when the whole attention of their 
minds is directed towards that single object, than when it is dissipated among a great variety 
of things. But in consequence of the division of labour, the whole of every man's attention 
comes naturally to be directed towards some one very simple object. (…) A great part of the 
machines made use of in those manufactures in which labour is most subdivided, were 
originally the inventions of common workmen, who, being each of them employed in some 
very simple operation, naturally turned their thoughts towards finding out easier and readier 
methods of performing it. Whoever has been much accustomed to visit such manufactures, 
must frequently have been shewn very pretty machines, which were the inventions of such 
workmen, in order to facilitate and quicken their own particular part of the work. (…) 
All the improvements in machinery, however, have by no means been the inventions of those 
who had occasion to use the machines. Many improvements have been made by the 
ingenuity of the makers of the machines, when to make them became the business of a 
peculiar trade; and some by that of those who are called philosophers or men of speculation, 
whose trade it is not to do any thing, but to observe every thing; and who, upon that account, 
are often capable of combining together the powers of the most distant and dissimilar 
objects.” (Smith, 1776/1904; sections 1.1.5; 1.1.8; 1.1.9) 
Just to mention another ‘modern’ issue, Smith (1776) also devoted a chapter to describe 
the co-evolution of transport technologies, markets, and division of labour, leading to 
economic development. His examples stretch from the case of ancient Egypt to his 
contemporary Holland in time and cover Africa, Asia and Europe in space. (Book I, Ch. 
III) 
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John Stuart Mill also identifies various types of innovations – technical, managerial and 
organisational, and financial –, and distinguishes invention from innovation (practical 
use) and incremental innovations during diffusion. Using modern terms, he also speaks 
of product and process innovations. Finally, he stresses the importance of diffusing new 
knowledge. 
“§4. The third element which determines the productiveness of the labour of a community, is 
the skill and knowledge therein existing; whether it be the skill and knowledge of the 
labourers themselves, or of those who direct their labour. No illustration is requisite to show 
how the efficacy of industry is promoted by the manual dexterity of those who perform mere 
routine processes; by the intelligence of those engaged in operations in which the mind has a 
considerable part; and by the amount of knowledge of natural powers and of the properties of 
objects, which is turned to the purposes of industry. That the productiveness of the labour of 
a people is limited by their knowledge of the arts of life, is self-evident; and that any 
progress in those arts, any improved application of the objects or powers of nature to 
industrial uses, enables the same quantity and intensity of labour to raise a greater produce. 
One principal department of these improvements consists in the invention and use of tools 
and machinery. (…) 
The use of machinery is far from being the only mode in which the effects of knowledge in 
aiding production are exemplified. In agriculture and horticulture, machinery is only now 
[1852] beginning to show that it can do anything of importance, beyond the invention and 
progressive improvement of the plough and a few other simple instruments. The greatest 
agricultural inventions have consisted in the direct application of more judicious processes to 
the land itself, and to the plants growing on it (…). In manufactures and commerce, some of 
the most important improvements consist in economizing time; in making the return follow 
more speedily upon the labour and outlay. There are others of which the advantage consists 
in economy of material. 
§5. But the effects of the increased knowledge of a community in increasing its wealth, need 
the less illustration as they have become familiar to the most uneducated, from such 
conspicuous instances as railways and steam-ships. A thing not yet so well understood and 
recognised, is the economical value of the general diffusion of intelligence among the 
people.” (Mill, 1848/1909, Book I, paragraphs 1.7.9-1.7.12) 
In his major book, Ricardo has also analysed major marketing and technological 
changes, for example “Sudden Changes in the Channels of Trade”, “the influence of 
machinery on the interests of the different classes of society”, on output, trade, profit, 
and employment. (Ricardo, 1817/1821, chapters 19 and 31) 
The way, in which Karl Marx has addressed technological changes and economic 
development is analysed in detail by many authors, most notably by Schumpeter (1942) 
[cf. Rosenberg, 2011], as well as by contemporary scholars of economics of innovation 
(e.g. Clark and Juma, 1988; Mazzolini and Nelson, 2013), and thus there is no need to 
stress here that Marx had paid attention to innovation. 
To conclude this brief overview, it is worth stressing that classical economists had not 
paid a particular attention to the allocation of scarce resources. Following Kaldor 
(1972), two functions of decentralised markets are identified by Dosi and Orsenigo 
(1988, p.14): allocation of resources and transmission of impulses to change. To 
generalise, classical economists had inclined to focus on the latter one. 
“Fundamental dynamic properties such as the relationship between expansion of markets, 
division of labour, and productivity growth in Smith, or the ‘increasing organic composition 
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of capital’ in Marx, are examples of a class of propositions argued on the grounds of the 
irreversible transformations originated by processes of what we could call ‘dynamic 
competition’. Moreover, their neglect of explicit microfoundations was justified on the 
grounds of what we may term a ‘holistic’ or ‘macroinstitutional’ assumption about 
behaviour: it seemed obvious to them that, for example, given an opportunity, capitalists 
were ready to seize it, or that their ‘institutional’ function was to invest and accumulate the 
surplus.” (ibid., emphasis in the original) 
 
4.3. Technical, organisational and institutional changes: exogenous 
factors in neo-classical economics 
Neo-classical economists abandoned the classical tradition at least in two crucial 
aspects: (i) they put allocative efficiency into the centre of their analysis, that is, a short-
term issue; and closely related to this rupture, (ii) neglected technological, institutional, 
behavioural and organisational changes. Their main new objective was to develop 
sophisticated models of general equilibrium and by doing so to turn economics into a 
‘hard science’, exemplified by Newtonian physics in the 19
th century. Walras 
(1874/1954, p.71), for example, perceived “the pure theory of economics or the theory 
of exchange and value in exchange” as a “physico-mathematical science like mechanics 
or hydrodynamics”. (cited in Clark and Juma, 1988, p.206)
55 In other words, a rich set 
of historical analyses offered by classical economics was replaced by an ahistorical, 
highly abstract theory. 
Since the late 19th century, however, economists – representatives of various schools 
who criticise each other, on the one hand, and methodologists and historians of 
economic thought, on the other – use the label of neo-classical in various ways. Two 
different approaches can be distinguished. (Lawson, 2013) First, this school is defined 
in relation to classical economics, assuming both continuity (in some aspects) and 
discontinuity (in others). Many of the authors following this approach establish that 
hardly any continuity can be found, and thus counter-classical or anti-classical would be 
more appropriate designations.56 Second, other authors seek to define common 
analytical features of writings labelled as neo-classical, that is, continuity with classical 
economics is not an issue in this (classification) approach. There is a non-negligible 
                                                          
55 For a more detailed account on this ‘zeal’ and its repercussions, see, e.g. Allen (1988, pp.96-97), as 
well as Clark and Juma (1988, pp.204-207). In his Nobel memorial lecture, Herbert Simon (1978, p.367) 
also touched upon this issue: “The social sciences have been accustomed to look for models in the most 
spectacular successes of the natural sciences. There is no harm in that, provided that it is not done in a 
spirit of slavish imitation. In economics, it has been common enough to admire Newtonian mechanics (or, 
as we have seen, the Law of Falling Bodies), and to search for the economic equivalent of the laws of 
motion. But this is not the only model for a science, and it seems, indeed, not to be the right one for our 
purposes.” It is also worth stressing that the “role model” for neo-classical economists already changed its 
“course”: “By the time Jevons and Walras began laying the cornerstones of modern economics, a 
spectacular revolution in physics had already brought down the mechanistic dogma both in the natural 
sciences and philosophy. And the curious fact is that none of the architects of ‘the mechanics of utility 
and self interest’ and none even of the latter-day model-builders seem to have been aware at any time of 
this downfall.” (Georgescu-Roegen, 1971, pp.2-3, cited in Clark and Juma, 1988, p.207) 
56 Lawson (2013, p.948) offers an overview of these claims, including a particularly vivid one by 
Schumpeter: “there is no more sense in calling the Jevons-Menger-Walras theory neoclassic than there 
would be calling the Einstein theory neo-Newtonian”. One could add, though, that Einstein’s theory 
seems to be much more relevant in explaining phenomena in physics than neo-classical economics in 
analysing economic developments. 
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diversity even inside this ’camp’, however.
57 For instance, the equilibrium states are 
quintessential for some authors, while for others are not. Moreover, there is some 
disagreement whether equilibria are supposed to always prevail axiomatically, or only 
their possible existence is among the main research questions. Just to mention a few 
attempts, the neo-classical school has been defined in the following ways (all cited by 
Lawson, 2013, p. 949): 
“(1) an individualistic perspective, a requirement that explanations be couched solely in 
terms of individuals; (2) an acceptance of some rationality axiom; and (3) a commitment to 
the study of equilibrium states.” (Hahn, 1984)  
“1. People have rational preferences among outcomes. 2. Individuals maximize utility and 
firms maximize profits. 3. People act independently on the basis of full and relevant 
information. Theories based on, or guided by, these assumptions are neoclassical theories 
(Weintraub, 2002).” 
Neo-classical economics “1) assumes rational, maximizing behaviour by agents with given 
and stable preference functions, (2) focuses on attained, or movements towards, equilibrium 
states, and (3) is marked by an absence of chronic information problems (Hodgson, 1999, p. 
29).” 
From the point of analysing innovations, the following neo-classical assumptions are 
essential: homogenous products, diminishing returns to scale, technologies accessible to 
all producers at zero cost, perfectly informed economic agents, perfect competition, and 
thus zero profit. In this framework, technological changes were treated as exogenous to 
the economic system. Thus, uncertainties were not considered, either; the underlying 
notion related to innovation was risk, assuming that the probability distribution of all 
possible events can be known a priori. The major actor in these models is the 
‘representative agent’, that is, a single person who – regardless of his or her field of 
activity – has no specific characteristics. In brief, innovation became a non-issue in neo-
classical economics. 
Building upon the neo-classical framework, Nelson (1959) and Arrow (1962) started a 
systematic analysis of firms’ in-house R&D activities. In this way, a certain type of 
technological innovations, that is, the ones based on intramural R&D results could be 
considered.58 It is an important ‘class’ of innovations, no doubt, but at least equally 
important ones were disregarded. These include: (a) innovations based on the results of 
extramural R&D projects conducted in the same or other sectors, at public or private 
research establishments, home or abroad; (b) all other technological innovations based 
on non-R&D type of knowledge, e.g. stemming from various other sources, such as 
design, scaling up, testing, tooling-up, trouble-shooting, and other engineering 
activities, ideas from suppliers and users, inventors’ concepts and practical experiments, 
as well as collaboration among engineers, designers, artists, and other creative ‘geeks’;
59 
and (c) non-technological innovations, such as organisational, managerial, marketing, or 
                                                          
57 A further issue, namely the confusion between neo-classical and mainstream economics is not 
discussed here. 
58 The first models of innovation, developed by practitioners – policy-makers or managers of in-house 
R&D units of large firms – and natural scientists also regarded R&D as the principal information source 
of innovations. These are the so-called science-push models of innovations. To describe their origin and 
features in detail, as well as subsequent linear and non-linear models of innovations is beyond the scope 
of this contribution. 
59 Further, innovative firms also utilise knowledge embodied in advanced materials, other inputs, 
equipment, and software. 
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financial ones, as well as new business models.60 Non-technological innovations are all 
the more important; as innovation studies have shown technological innovations can 
hardly be introduced without organisational and managerial innovations.61 Moreover, to 
latter ones – together with marketing innovations – are vital for the success of the 
former ones. 
The pioneering work by Nelson and Arrow first looked as a promising extension of neo-
classical economics, e.g. leading to economics of information, but in light of Nelson’s 
later major contributions, can also be seen as the first step opening up fundamentally 
new avenues, namely evolutionary and institutional economics of innovation. 
 
4.4. Social innovation and the assumptions of neo-classical 
economics 
Social innovation is defined by the CRESSI project as follows: The development and 
delivery of new ideas (products, services, models, markets, processes) at different socio-
structural levels that intentionally seek to improve human capabilities, social relations, 
and the processes in which these solutions are carried out. 
Clearly, the theoretical framework of neo-classical economics cannot accommodate 
social innovations for several reasons. Just to highlight some of the most important 
ones, for social innovators the major goal is not optimisation in a strict economic sense. 
Second, social innovators do face uncertainty, too, not only calculable risks. Third, 
dynamic aspects are crucial, e.g. changes in the environment, in which social 
innovations take place; moreover, to induce this change is indeed among the major 
goals of social innovation. Fourth, various types of changes – economic, technological, 
organisational, social (e.g. structural, behavioural) and political – are endogenous from 
the point of view of social innovations, and co-evolve. Policy governance sub-systems 
and the level of governance need to be considered, too. In other words, these changes 
and co-evolutionary processes cannot be treated as exogenous. Fifth, social innovators 
are neither ‘representative agents’, nor do they act on their own. They have their own 
specific features, partly shaped by the context, in which they operate, and they need to 
interact with several other actors, and often form formal or informal networks to do so. 
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